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PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE UNDER THE
MAIL OBSCENITY LAW
By F. MICHAEL LUDWIG*
I. INTRODUCTION
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile
article, matter, thing, device, or substance; . . . is declared
to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the
mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter
carrier.
Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing,
carriage in the mails, or delivery of anything declared by
this section to be nonmailable, . . . shall be fined not more
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both,
for the first such offense, and shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both, for
each such offense thereafter .... I
It is not the purpose of this paper to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the statute since it is well settled that obscenity is not
protected by the First Amendment. One of the recent expressions
of this point was made in the now famous case of Roth v. United
States.2 Mr. Justice Brennan stated in reference to the protection of
the First Amendment;
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social
importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even
ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the
full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because
they encroach upon the limited area of more important in-
terests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment
is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming
social importance. 3
Instead of attempting to weave a thread among all the vari-
ous expressions of what is obscene and what is not, the test de-
veloped in the Roth case will be the one referred to throughout
the discussion which follows. The test is that "Obscene material
is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient
interests. ' '4 In this approach the court adopts the definition of the
Model Penal Code.5 The recent case of Manual Enterprises Inc.
v. Day6 may have narrowed the test somewhat since two of the
Justices would tighten the test for condemning obscenity by requir-
ing that the condemned material be both appealing to the prurient
interest and patently offensive to the sensibilities.
The basic aim of this paper is narrow, in that it attempts to
show the impropriety of judging the obscenity of a private letter
June graduate, University of Denver College of Law.
1 18 U.S.C. § 1461.
2 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
3 Id. at 484. (Footnote of the Court omitted.)
4 Id. at 487.
5 § 207.10 (tentative draft No. 6, 1957).
6370 U.S. 478 (1962).
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by the "average person" test announced in the Roth case. Justice
Brennan, using the instruction given in the lower court, set out
the test:
[T]he test is not whether it would arouse sexual de-
sires or sexual impure thoughts in those comprising a
particular segment of the community, the young, the im-
mature or the highly prudish or would leave another seg-
ment, the scientific or highly educated or the so-called
worldly-wise and sophisticated indifferent and un-
moved ....
The test in each case is the effect of the book, picture
or publication considered as a whole, not upon any par-
ticular class, but upon all those whom it is likely to reach.
In other words, you determine its impact upon the average
person in the community.
7
The spectre of the "average man" arises in still another area of
the law.
A brief outline of the private letter in the law of obscenity
will be given, followed by a brief discussion of the elements neces-
sary to sustain a conviction. Finally, the "average person" test will
be shown in its application to private correspondence in the light
of cases decided before and subsequent to the Roth case.
II. HISTORY OF TITLE 19 U.S.C. § 1461
The statute under which prosecutions are initiated is the
famous Comstock Act which was first enacted in 1865.8 The funda-
7 Roth v. United States, supra note 2, at 490.
8 Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 89 § 16, 13 Stat. 504.
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mental language of the act remained substantially unchanged un-
til at the insistence of Comstock himself it was rewritten and re-
enacted in 1873.0 Minor amendments followed but nothing affecting
private communication appeared until title 18, section 334 of the
United States Code was adopted. This section contained the word
"letter" and led to the first case problem involving private com-
munications of an obscene nature. In 1955 the act was amended
again and the word "letter" was removed and "matter" was sub-
stituted in its place.' The intent of the legislature was not to
limit the purview of the statute but rather to extend it." The re-
moval of the word "letter" from the act was of no great significance
since, as will be shown, the courts have no difficulty finding private
letters, as well as other letters, subject to the act in its present form.
The intent of the revision, which can be gathered from many
sources, r1 is to protect the public morals by eliminating all ob-
scene matter, private or otherwise, from the mails of the United
States.
The history of the private letter under the original act is one
of judicial confusion as to whether such a document was subject
to the restraint of the statute. In the late 1800's many lower federal
court cases held that private letters were not to be included under
the statute.' At the same time, however, there were an almost
equal number of cases in which the courts held that the statute
was meant to include private letters.' 4 The only Supreme Court
case to deal with the problem arose under 18 U.S.C. § 334, the act
which included the word "letter." 5 The Court answered the ques-
tion in a magnificent fashion, refusing to hold whether the term
"letter" included private communication. Finally, in the year 1896
the Supreme Court was faced with the question again. 16 The Court
was asked to reverse a conviction of one Andrews for mailing two
obscene letters to a specific addressee who, interestingly enough,
was an agent of the post office. The agent had seen an advertise-
ment placed by the defendant and answered it using an assumed
name. The letters were in response to his solicitation. The court
faced the private correspondence question and answered it as
follows:
Owing . . . to the doubt thus suggested, it was held in
several of the lower courts that the word 'letter,' thus in-
troduced into the statute, must, in the light of other words
used, be deemed to be some sort of a publication, and not
merely private sealed letters. [Citations omitted.]
However, any doubt there may have been as to the
") Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598.
10 18 U.S.C. § 1461.
112 U.S. Cong. & Admn. News 84th ch. 1955, p. 2210.
12 Ibid.
13United States v. Jarvis, 59 Fed. 357 (N.D. Wash. 1894) ; United States v.
Warner, 59 Fed. 355 (N.D. Wash. 1894); United States v. Wilson, 58 Fed.
768 (N.D. Cal. 1893); United States v. Durant, 46 Fed. 753 (E.D. S.C.
1891); United States v. Clark, 43 Fed. 574 (S.D. Iowa 1890).
14 United States v. Ling, 61 Fed. 1001 (Conn. 1894) ; United States v. Nathan,
61 Fed. 936 (N.D. Iowa 1894); United States v. Martin, 50 Fed. 918 (W.D.
Va. 1892); In re Wahll, 42 Fed. 822 (Minn. 1890).
15 United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255 (1890).
16 United States v. Andrews, 162 U.S. 420 (1896).
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proper meaning to be given to the word has been removed
by the case above cited, Grimm v. U.S., where mailing a
private sealed letter, in an envelope on which nothing ap-
peared but the name and address, but containing obscene
matter, was held to be an offense within the statute.17
Since this case, the private letter has been held to be within the
meaning of the statute. It would be a wasted argument to attempt
to show otherwise. The quarrel is not with its inclusion under the
statute but with the test applied to determine a letter's obscenity
or lack of it.
III. THE ELEMENTS OF SCIENTER AND MOTIVE UNDER THE STATUTE
Before approaching the problems posed by the "average per-
son" test, it is necessary to point out certain elements which are
necessary for a conviction under this statute. The fundamental
problem to confront the court in applying the statute has been that
of scienter. What actual intent or knowledge must the accused have
to be guilty under the act? That issue came before the Supreme
Court in 1896 by virtue of a prosecution under Revised Statutes
section 3893. The case involved a man by the name of Rosen who
was accused of mailing a newspaper which contained photographs
of females partially obscured with lampblack. Any recipient with
a little effort and the price of a piece of bread could, by erasure,
eliminate all doubt as to the models' physical attributes. The de-
fendant contended that the indictment was defective because it
charged him only with wilfully, unlawfully, and knowingly deposit-
ing the newspaper in the mail. He maintained that he must be
charged with knowledge that the contents of the newspaper were
obscene. The Court answered his contention in this fashion:
Of course he [the defendant] did not understand the
government as claiming that the mere depositing in the post
office of an obscene, lewd, and lascivious paper was an
offence under the statute, if the person so depositing it
had neither knowledge nor notice, at the time, of its char-
acter or contents. He must have understood from the
words of the indictment that the government imputed to
him knowledge or notice of the contents of the paper so de-
posited.1s
The accused is not required by the above language to know that
the contents are obscene, all he need know is what is in fact con-
tained. After the Rosen case the lower courts abided by this theory
on scienter. In 1906 the same question was presented to an appeals
court.19 The case involved a conviction under the same statute as
in the Rosen case. The defendants were accused of mailing out a
booklet of 308 pages of lewd and obscene matter. The defendants
moved for an acquittal contending that the facts were not suf-
ficient to show that they did in fact mail the books. The court dis-
posed of this contention by holding the partnership agreement of
the defendants was sufficient to indicate that the intent was that
17 Id. at 424.
1 8 United States v. Rosen, 161 U.S. 29, 33 (1896).
19 United States v. Burton, 142 Fed. 57 (8th Cir. 1906).
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the books would be mailed. The court felt this was sufficient to
bring the defendants within the purview of the statute. A ninth
circuit case decided in 1953 clearly states the scienter requirement.
20
This was an appeal from a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1461 for
mailing a book called the "Arabian Love Manual." The defendant
attempted to place his attorney on the stand to testify that the
book was brought to the attorney who advised the defendant that
it was legally mailable. The appellate court sustained the lower
court's ruling as to the inadmissibility of this testimony. Citing
the Rosen case as the leading authority, the court said: "There the
defendant unavailingly asked the court to instruct the jury that
he should be acquitted if they entertained a reasonable doubt
whether he knew the publication he had placed in the mail was
obscene. '21 The court then pointed out that on the authority of the
Rosen case the defendant's contention was untenable.
22
Probably the leading case on scienter is Smith v. California.
2 3
However this case involved a city ordinance which attempted to
impose strict liability on sellers of lewd books. The case has no
direct bearing on 18 U.S.C. § 1461, and will not be further discussed
than to say that all drafters of local obscenity ordinances should
study its ruling.
In a recent California case, the court in one sentence disposed
of the scienter requirement by saying: "In our view, the scienter re-
quired is established by appellant's knowledge as the writer of the
letters, that they were obscene within the meaning of section 1461
when construed according to the standard declared in Roth.
24 It
is the view of the author that the court did not mean that a person
must be aware of the fact that the matter was obscene. This point
is too well settled by all prior cases to allow such an interpretation
at this time, but the language is none the less interesting. This case
will be discussed in a later section dealing with the "average per-
son" standard.
Another problem which the courts have faced has been that of
the motive of the accused. One early case to deal with the problem
involved a Deadwood, S.D., newspaperman who was accused of
publishing and mailing an obscene newspaper. The editorial
scourged society for its views on premarital relationships. The court
recognized his good motive and sincerity but held:
His motive may have been never so pure; if the paper
he mailed was obscene, he is guilty. There is no reference
in the statute to the design or intent that a man has in de-
positing nonmailable matter in the mail. He cannot violate
the law even though his purpose be to accomplish good.
25
It is evident that Anthony Comstock had pushed "the last frontier"
farther West than Deadwood, S.D., when the law concerned itself
with "lewd" editorials about young girls in trouble. Nine years
later the ninth circuit court sustained a lower court's ruling that
20 United States v. Schindler, 208 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1953).
21 Id. at 290.
22 Ibid.
23361 U.S. 147 (1959).
24 United States v. Ackerman, 293 F.2d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1961).
25 Knowles v. United States, 170 Fed. 409, 411 (8th Cir. 1909).
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questions put to the defendants concerning their motives were
inadmissible as immaterial. 26
Probably the most famous case on the question of motive is
the Dennatt caseY7 The accused felt that her sons were lacking in
a proper understanding of the facts of life so she wrote a little
pamphlet to point out the true outlook on sexual matters. So suc-
cessful was the attempt that she began selling the pamphlets
through the mail for $.25 each. Prosecution soon followed. The
court held the contents of the pamphlets not to be obscene; but on
the question of the author's obviously pure motive, Judge Augustus
Hand, speaking for the court, said:
It is doubtless true that the personal motive of the
defendant is distributing her pamphlet could have no bear-
ing on the question whether she violated the law. Her own
belief that a really obscene pamphlet would pay the price
for its obscenity by means of intrinsic merits would leave
her as much as ever under the ban of the statute.
28
A 1950 case specifically applied the general rule as to motive
to private communication. 29 This was a prosecution under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1461 for mailing lewd and obscene letters to two strangers. The
court referred to the Dennatt case and held that the motive of the
defendant was immaterial. Another recent case involving a vile
letter sent to the accused's girl friend again emphasizes the court's
complete disapproval of any reference to the accused's motive.3 0
The defendant claimed that the letter was motivated by anger and
not by lust or perversion. The court held this contention was of no
merit. 31 A similar case arose in the sixth circuit and the motive
question was again disposed of in short order.
32
To attack the application of the statute to private correspon-
dence the grounds of scienter and motive is now a fruitless exercise
of theoretical reasoning. The questions are too well settled. If a
person deposits an item in the mail knowing its contents, he has
met the requirements of scienter under the statute. If the matter
is found to be obscene, the motive of the sender is immaterial.
26 Magon v. United States, 248 Fed. 201 (9th Cir. 1918).
27 United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930).
21 Id. at 568.
•9 Verner v. United States, 183 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1950).
30 Cain v. United States, 274 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1960).
31 Ibid.
2 Thomas v. United States, 262 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1959).
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Consequently, any limitation of the statute's application to private
correspondence must lie in the question of what standard is to
apply. The courts already have been faced with this issue.33
IV. THE SEARCH FOR A STANDARD
The standard to be applied to private handwritten communica-
tions addressed to a specific person has become important in light
of the standard announced in the Roth case which held that 18
U.S.C. § 1461 was constitutional when the proper test was applied.
Before the Court's holding in the above case, the lower federal
courts had dealt in many different ways with the problem of what
standard to apply to such matters. Two early cases demonstrate
the confusion that existed prior to the Roth case. The case of
United States v. Wroblenski34 concerned a letter sent by a son to
his mother accusing her of adulterous intercourse with a son-in-
law. The court pointed out that such a letter is under the purview
of the statute but had this to say concerning the standard to be
applied to judge its obscene nature:
The language or communication may be free from the
condemnation of the statute in one instance, while it would
clearly fall within it when addressed to other persons. So
the inquiry as to the tendency of the letter must be nar-
rowed to its liability to corrupt the addressee, and no such
tendency can be imputed to this letter to the mother of the
defendant.
35
In a later case, a husband sent an allegedly obscene letter to his
wife. 36 The court rejected the standard set out in the above case
and held:
It matters not what the relationship between sender
and sendee is, or what the effect of the receipt of the ar-
ticle sent may have on the mind of the particular person to
whom it is sent. If it is of such a nature that the reading
would, in the opinion of reasonable persons, or the jurors
selected to try the case, have a tendency to deprave or
corrupt the minds of reasonable persons and would suggest
to the minds of either sex thoughts of an impure or libidi-
nous character, it is within the prohibition of the statute. 37
However, a 1950 case may have returned to the standard of the
effect on the addressee.3s The court said, "The letters were non-
mailable material if they had a tendency to deprave or corrupt the
morals of those who would receive them."
3 9
The only Supreme Court case touching the matter in this
period was United States v. Limehouse.40 In that opinion, Justice
Brandeis cites the case of Swearingen v. United States,4 and quotes
3 3 United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
34 118 Fed. 495 (E.D. Wis. 1902).
35Id. at 496.
36 United States v. Musgrave, 160 Fed. 700 (E.D. Ark. 1908).
37Id. at 706.
38 Verner v. United States, supra note 28.
39 Id. at 185.
40285 U.S. 424 (1932).
41161 U.S. 446 (1896).
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the wording of the Court that language must be "calculated to
corrupt and debauch the mind and morals of those into whose
hands it might fall. '42 Unfortunately, that case cannot be considered
a standard setting case because the main thrust of the opinion was
aimed at a definition of the word "filthy." At most, the language
is dicta. It must be remembered that throughout this period the
courts were struggling with the broader problem of defining ob-
scenity itself, an area this paper is not specifically concerned with.
The conflict among the lower courts set the stage for the definition
enunciated in the Roth case. The test was, "whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken, as a whole appeals to the prurient
interests. '43 Our purpose now is to determine whether a private let-
ter is properly to be held to this standard.
The Court, in adopting its now famous "test," borrowed the
definition formulated by the drafters of the Model Penal Code.
44 It
must be noted that the drafters also defined what would be non-
criminal dissemination stating that "dissemination not for gain, to
personal associates other than children under sixteen '45 was non-
criminal. In the comments on this section it is stated: "The illogic
of making private circulation of obscenity criminal can be seen
in relation to a case where the man writes sexual proposals, of an
admittedly obscene character, to a woman who welcomes such
correspondence, his mistress for example.
'46
This is in itself an extreme position which is worthy of deeper
study but which is beyond the scope of the present article.. How-
ever, the point is important to show that the private letter problem
is being studied. With this in mind the basic problem presents itself.
Should private letters which are not sent for gain or in an indis-
criminate fashion be held to the same standard as books, magazines,
and other publications aimed at a mass audience? The arguments
which follow are based on a belief that private letters between
parties acquainted with one another whether personally or through
past dealings should not be judged by the "average man" test. Of
course, private letters which are indiscriminately sent to offend
the recipients are not worthy of protection.4 7 These would include
"crank" letters and letters sent as a method of release for the
mentally immature.
V. THE CASE FOR VARIABLE OBSCENITY
The leading proponents of the variable obscenity standard are
Professors William B. Lockhart and Robert C. McClure of the Uni-
versity of Minnesota Law School. They present a very persuasive
argument for an approach more flexible than the Roth test in their
article, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
42 Id. at 451.
43 Roth v. United States, supra note 2, at 489.
44 Supra note 4.
45 Id. at 3.
46Id. at 16, 17.
47 Paul and Schwartz, Obscenity in the Mails: A Comment on Some Problems
of Federal Censorship, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 214, 239-244 (1958).
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Standards.48 They point out that a variable obscenity standard
would hold that nothing is obscene on its face but only is obscene
in its effect.49 They argue for a standard uniformly applied. This
author feels that since obscene matters are as varied as the imagina-
tion of man can make them, that uniformity may not really be
desirable. A line should be drawn between the test applied to a
private letter writer and that applied to the commercial exploiter.
The Roth case has set out the standard for the purveyor; need this
be the standard for all allegedly obscene matter? The variable
obscenity standard would judge material by its appeal to and effect
upon the audience to which it is primarily directed.50 The test re-
quires a determination of the primary audience and then the crea-
tion of a hypothetical person typical of the audience.51 Following
the prurient interest test formulated in the Roth case, the material
would be judged obscene only if it appealed to the prurient interest
of the typical person of the primary audience to which the matter
is directed. The application of this test to the private correspondence
situation would necessarily require the matter to appeal to the
prurient interests of the addressee. It is the purpose of this article
to point out the reasons why the variable obscenity test should in
fact be the standard.
The Roth standard in its application has not been free from
attacks by the courts themselves. What might be called the "per-
fect case" to illustrate the fallacy in trying to apply the Roth test
arose under the sister statute to 18 U.S.C. § 1461 which makes
unlawful the importation of obscene material from any foreign
country.52 The Kinsey Institute sought to import thirty-one photo-
graphs and other examples of foreign pornography for use in re-
search. The government sought to suppress the photos.53 Judge
Palmieri granted the Institute's motion for summary judgment.
He was faced with the paradox of finding something obscene under
the "average person" test when it was to be seen only by a group
of scientists who in all probability would not even be aware that
their prurient interests were being appealed to. In discussing the
Roth standard, Judge Palmieri said:
But the search for a definition does not end there.
To whose prurient interest must the work appeal? While
the rule is often stated in terms of the appeal of the mate-
rial to the "average person," [citation omitted] it must
be borne in mind that the cases applying the standard in
this manner do so in regard to material which is to be dis-
tributed to the public at large. I believe, however, that the
more inclusive statement of the definition is that which
judges the material by its appeal to "all those whom it is
likely to reach." [Citation omitted.] Viewed in this light,
the "average man" test is but a particular application of the
rule, often found in the cases only because the cases often
4845 MINN. L. REV. 5, 77-88 (1960).
49Id. at 77.
50 Ibid.
51 id. at 78-79.




deal with material which is distributed to the public at
large.
54
The problem raised by this case is essentially the same as arises
when the Roth standard is used when a private letter is alleged to
be obscene. Although Judge Palmieri did not state the variable
obscenity test in so many words, he did in effect apply the test.
Attorneys for the government are aware of the difficulties in
applying the "average man" test to private letters. This is made
plain by a military court-martial case55 which involved letters
54 Id. at 354-355. (Footnotes of Court omitted.)
. United States v. Holt, 31 C.M.R. 57 (1961).
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written to a thirteen year old girl by the defendant, age thirty-one,
who was married but separated from his wife. The two had become
intimate and the letters were saved by the girl only to be discovered
and brought to light by the girl's mother. The defendant was
charged with carnal knowledge in violation of Article 120 and three
specifications of mailing obscene letters in violation of Article 134
under the military code. The court apparently applied the variable
obscenity test but found that the letters would be obscene no matter
what test was applied.;6 The court mentions in a footnote that the
government conceded that the "average person" test was inapplic-
able, but felt the question need not be decided because the letters
were, in effect, obscene per se.5 7 It has been pointed out, however,
that this is an error since the argument by the government was in
the alternative.58 The court did not feel obliged to apply any stand-
ard, but it is this author's contention that a strict application of
the variable obscenity test may have necessitated a different result.
To review, a letter to be obscene under this test must be found
to appeal to the prurient interests of the recipient. The girl herself
testified that she considered the letters "just [the accused's] way
of saying things."59 I believe the court did not give sufficient weight
to such testimony; certainly the relationship was sordid but this
is a distinct question and should not have a bearing on the question
of the obscenity of the letters. The question remains, did the letters
appeal to the prurient interests of the recipient, or were they merely
expressions of desire expressed in terms not the most delicate but
understood by both to be ordinary and normal? The court simply
stated that the letters were obscene by whatever standard ap-
plied.60 The court, therefore, held that the letters were obscene as
far as the court was concerned without any reference to the effect
on the girl. This is not an application of the variable obscenity test,
nor in fact, is it an application of any standard so far announced,
unless it be that the letters had a tendency to appeal to the prurient
interests of the court itself. Referring to the comment by the draft-
ers of the Model Penal Code one who enjoys this type of
communication should not be liable to criminal sanctions without
at least a showing of an appeal to the prurient interests of the re-
cipient.6 ' The case remains valuable for one reason, that being the
indication that the government is aware of the difficulty of apply-
ing the average person test to private letters, particularly where
there is an element of mutual sentiment between the parties, and
even more particularly where the recipient was not offended but
a member of her family the complainant was offended.
If this paper could be concluded at this point, the task of the au-
thor in attempting to show that the "average person" test should not
be applied to private correspondence would be met by a showing of
the problem involved. However, a federal court of appeals recently
56Id. at 59.
5 Id. at 58, footnote 2.
58 Zuckman, The Law of Obscenity and Military Practice, 20 MIL. L. REV. 43,
52, footnote 42 (1963).
, Supra note 54, at 58.60 Id. at 59.
61 Supra note 4.
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applied the "average person" test to just such a situation.6 .2 The
task now becomes one of attempting to answer the objections to
the variable obscenity test set out in the opinion. The case involved
letters written by a man who apparently was a published author
of works on homosexuality to a person he believed to be a lesbian.
His admitted purpose was to gain some insight into this subworld
of life. The recipient was in fact not a lesbian but a married man,
aged thirty-eight, and the father of two children. The defendant
was convicted and he appealed; the conviction was affirmed. The
defendant alleged that the Roth standard was inapplicable to pri-
vate letters. The court disposed of this contention and gave three
reasons. 63 The first reason was that the mailing of private letters
by cranks and crackpots would be facilitated since the obscene
character would depend on the reaction of the addressees. This is
simply not true. The variable obscenity test would force letters
indiscriminately mailed to be judged by their effect on the com-
munity of the recipient, i.e., a girls school or a women's club. One
letter sent by a crank would be judged on its effect on the indivi-
dual recipient. If it is capable of appealing to the prurient interests
of the recipient, it is obscene; but if it is not, criminal prosecution
seems unjustified. The court next points out that some writers of
obscene letters would escape prosecution. The point of the variable
obscenity test is that a writing is not obscene, until a standard is
applied and the issue submitted to the finder of fact for its deter-
mination. The court placed the cart before the horse in saying that
a letter could be obscene without the application of any standard.
If the letter appeals to the prurient interests of the recipient, it is
obscene but not before. Finally, the court points out that well-
intentioned letter writers would possibly find themselves liable
for writing a letter which is later found to be obscene. Unfortu-
nately, the question of motive has been so strongly held not to be
an issue in prosecution under this statute, that a result such as
this is possible. But we must look at the possible results under a
strict application of the Roth standard. An equally well-intentioned
letter writer who writes a letter in language he knows or has reason
to believe would not appeal to the prurient interests of the recipient
finds his criminal liability judged on the reaction of an "average
man" who very possibly is quite a different person from his ad-
dressee. The point is that a writer of a potentially obscene letter
would have a much truer yardstick by which to gauge his possible
guilt if the recipient's reaction is to be the test, rather than that
of a mythical man in a mythical community. One cannot help but
wonder if the court was unaware of another possible result. A
highly educated man could write a letter to an equally well-edu-
cated woman in terms which would appeal to her prurient in-
terests but the very same terms would not appeal to the same in-
terests of our friend the "average person" in the community since
he could not be said to understand them. Here is hard core porno-
graphy on a high level escaping the constrictures of the statute. 4
62 Ackerman v. United States, 293 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1961).
63 Id. at 453.
64 United States v. Darnell, 316 F.2d 813, 820 (2d Cir. 1963). (Judge Moore
dissenting.)
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A final case should be mentioned at this point. The case is
United States v. Darne165 which involved a letter written to a
woman by a man of her acquaintance informing her of facts tend-
ing to show that her husband was a homosexual and an adulteror.
The letter was written in three and four letter words and not in
the most delicate fashion. The court sustained a conviction stating:
This is a result which we cannot view with satisfaction,
since a private communication only brought to light by the
addressee would hardly seem to merit criminal prosecution,
particularly when it involves merely use of coarse language
for which the writer could have substituted more refined
phraseology, had he been so minded.6
No indication is given of what standard was applied although
the Roth case is cited as requiring the decision. Here is a perfect
case for the application of the standard contended for by this paper.
The jury or the judge, as the case may be, should determine from
the evidence presented whether the letter appealed to the prurient
interests of the woman recipient.
The dissenting opinion by Judge Moore is a classic example of
the method of argument known as reductio ad absurdum. He does
not contend that a different standard should be applied but feels
the very idea of criminal prosecution for such a letter giving in-
formation in unfortunate terms is not only absurd but dangerous. 67
He points out an idea, mentioned earlier in this paper, that this
was possibly the only language the woman would understand and
probably the only language the defendant knew how to use. The
letter was informational in its nature. Does this cause it to appeal
to the prurient interests of the recipient, or does it cause merely
anger and distress? The prurient interests of the recipient should
be the test. If that had been applied to this case the result probably
would have been different.
Aside from the need of application of the variable obscenity
test to letters of this nature the author cannot help but agree with
Judge Moore when he says in reference to the total concept:
If revelations of homosexual practices set forth in
sealed private letters are to be brought within the purview
of the statute, then let it be publicly known that the public
writes at its peril and that only that should be written
which will pass the ultimate censorship of judges and
juries. If true enforcement is to be obtained, the Post Office
Department will have to keep steam kettles boiling on a
twenty-four hour schedule so that offenders may be ap-
prehended. If this letter, so patently not doing so when
read in its entirety, keeping in mind its purpose (quite
largely informational), is to be held the means of imposing
a criminal conviction upon this young man, then we really
have cause for worry. "1984" and "Big Brother" are already
here. 68
65 Ibid.
66 Id. at 814.
67 Id. at 814-820.
68 Id. at 820.
